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Abstract 
This paper explains the profitability gap between the better performing Nordic banks and their 
Southern European counterparts. The research, focused on the 2010-2017 period, ascertains 
that there are substantial differences in corporate governance mechanisms between the groups’ 
largest banks, but these either are non-significant or show mixed results when correlated with 
profitability. Additionally, the gap is partially explained by the higher Southern effective tax 
rates coupled with an increased focus on retail banking activity in the Nordics, but liquidity, 
proxied by total deposits over total assets, was found to positively influence profitability and to 
be higher in the South. 
Key words: Banks, Financial Sector, Europe, Profitability, Corporate Governance, Liquidity. 
1. Introduction 
Measuring profitability, that is, the degree to which a business or activity yields return, is 
vital when assessing both a company’s current performance and its prospects. Eleven years 
after the 2007 financial crisis the European financial system has bounced back rather 
successfully. Still, recently there have been growing concerns regarding its health as 
governmental deficits and debts reach harmful levels, non-performing loans pile up in some 
major European banking institutions and the European Union’s unity is tested by Brexit. Upon 
a closer analysis, however, there is a clear divide between the Nordic and Southern European 
banking institutions. This difference has not yet been fully explained, with the Nordic banks 
consistently faring generally much better than their Southern counterparts. This divide is very 
noticeable when analyzing European banks’ profitability ratios1, as it is shown in Figure 1. 
                                                             
1 Several ratios offer different measures of profitability and this paper utilizes the ROA ratio, Return on Assets, 
given by equation: 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠⁄ , with Net Income  being the company’s total earnings net of costs 
of doing business, depreciation, interest, taxes and other expenses, and Total Assets being the total economic value 
of all the resources owned by the business. 
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Figure 1 – European banking sector average profitability (ROA %), Nordic vs Southern countries comparison 
(2007 S2-2018 S1), source: Bloomberg terminal, IMF FSI indicators 
Explaining this difference and finding it’s causes is essential to mend the performance 
gap between Nordic and Southern European banks which is crucial for the stability and health 
of the Southern European economies and for the European Union at large due to the inter-
connectiveness of its member states’ markets. Further integration in the Union would also be 
greatly eased with increased economic homogeneity. 
Past research into this issue focused on macroeconomic differences as explanatory 
variables (Sinn; D'Acunto & Oldrini, 2013), along with balance sheet vulnerabilities, with a 
special emphasis on non-performing loans, and business model differences (Soares; 2017, 
Detragiache; Tressel & Turk-Ariss, 2018), but, so far, the corporate governance differences 
have been neglected despite the fact that decisions which impact operating profitability are 
taken by managers and other members of corporate governing bodies. When in place and 
complying with the core principles for banking supervision, effective corporate governance 
mechanisms aid in creating value by granting stability, operational efficiency and sustainable 
growth (OECD, 2015). With large cultural differences between the Nordic and Southern 
European countries, it is reasonable to assume that there are significant differences in the 
corporate governance mechanisms in use between both groups. As such, this paper is concerned 
with building a sturdier model that explains the existing performance gap between Nordic and 
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Southern European banks by incorporating corporate governance mechanisms as explanatory 
variables. 
The paper proceeds as follow: Section 2 introduces the key concepts used along the paper 
and the theoretical background behind it. Section 3 reviews the literature about determinants of 
profitability in the banking sector. Section 4 describes the methodology employed, sources of 
the data used along with variables and their proxies, the sample and it outlines the development 
of the research questions. Section 5 discusses the statistical analysis’ results along with obtained 
insights regarding the research questions while Section 6 presents concluding remarks and 
provides suggestions for future research. 
2. Theoretical and Contextual Background 
2.1. Key Concepts: Profitability, Corporate Governance and Liquidity 
Profitability is commonly defined as the degree to which a business or activity yields returns 
that surpass its expenses in a given period of time and in relation to the size of the business. 
Several ratios offer different measures of profitability, some more appropriate than others 
varying with the purpose of the analysis, to whom it addresses and the specificities of the sector. 
This paper utilizes the ROA, Return on Assets, ratio, given by equation [1]: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
[1] 
With Net Income being the company’s total earnings net of costs of doing business, 
depreciation, interest, taxes and other expenses, and Total Assets being the total economic value 
of all the resources owned by the business. In the banking industry, the use of Net Income in 
detriment of the Earnings Before Interest & Taxes is justified by the difficulty in separating the 
debt interest from the interest contained in the Total Interest Expense account that is part of the 
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Financial Margin. For this reason, the ROA with Net Income in its numerator is the preferred 
method of measuring asset profitability. 
Corporate Governance encompasses the mechanisms, processes and relations through 
which firms are controlled and directed (Shailer, 2004) and it involves striking a balance 
between the interests of the companies’ various stakeholders, which range from their 
shareholders, management and employees to the communities they operate in and their 
respective governments. These mechanisms reach the various components of management, 
including action planning, the decision-making process, internal controls, performance 
measurement and corporate disclosure. It is noteworthy that while the concepts of management 
and corporate governance are sometimes, and incorrectly, used interchangeably, the latter puts 
an emphasis on the examination of underlying purpose and legitimacy (McRitchie, 1999).  
Effective Corporate Governance is tied to business integrity and market confidence, and 
it requires “a sound legal, regulatory and institutional framework that market participants can 
rely on when they establish their private contractual obligations” (OECD, 2015: 13). To foster 
successful Corporate Governance, in 1999 the OECD developed a series of principles intended 
to guide policy makers, and it kept updating them up until 2015. Still, there are several different 
Corporate Governance models in use that vary in power concentration and rigidness, from the 
strict Japanese model to the decentralized Anglo-Saxon one. In Europe, three distinct models 
are dominant: the Anglo-Saxon model, the Continental model, and the Nordic one which differs 
from both in some respects.  
Liquidity is a concept applied to assets which describes the easiness with which they can 
be bought or sold without affecting their prices. However, it is important to distinguish solvency 
from liquidity. A solvent firm effectively owns more than it owes, implying its total assets have 
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a positive net worth, i.e. in case of liquidation2 there would be shareholders that receive back at 
least a portion of their investments in the business. Despite their difference, both liquidity and 
solvency are important indicators of a firm’s overall financial health and measuring both 
requires the use of distinct ratios.  
To see how both corporate governance and liquidity can, in theory, change ROA’s value, 
we can further break down the ratio through the Dupont method3 as shown in equations [2] and 
[3]: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝐸𝐵𝑇4
×
𝐸𝐵𝑇
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒5
×
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒6
×
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
  [2] 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 × 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 × 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 & 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
× 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 
[3] 
Differences in liquidity should pose a two-sided effect on profitability. On one hand, less 
liquid assets have higher yields while on the other having a higher liquidity lowers debt interest 
rates for leveraged firms, in accordance to the expected bankruptcy hypothesis (Berger, 1995) 
which will be further elaborated upon in section 3. As such, all ratios of the decomposed ROA, 
excluding the Fixed Costs Effect, should be altered by liquidity. As for how corporate 
governance may impact profitability, for instance, bigger boards and more numerous 
committees increase personnel expenses and directly increase the Fixed Costs Effect, but these 
may also imply a larger knowledge pool and better managerial decisions which could increase 
                                                             
2 In finance, liquidation is a process through which a business is ended by dismantling itself and distributing the 
assets to claimants. Whoever has invested assets in the firm holds a claim to them, but its priority varies according 
to the investors’ status. Debtholders are first in line, with more senior claims who have collateral on loans to the 
business taking precedence followed by unsecured creditors, and shareholders follow second, where preferred 
stockholders take precedence over the remaining ones. 
3 Developed in the 1920s, it decomposes the ROE into several components that determine its value: the net margin, 
asset turnover ratio and the equity multiplier. Through basic calculus, it showed how closely related ROE and 
ROA are by concluding that ROE = (1 – effective tax rate) ROA x Equity Multiplier (total assets / shareholder’s 
equity). The final part of the equation is often designated by the term financial leverage. 
4 EBT stands for Earnings Before Taxes. 
5 Operational Revenue is the sum of interest and financial activity revenues net of interest expenses, fees and 
commissions. 
6 Net Interest Income is the total interest revenue minus interest expenses. 
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revenues and positively alter Risk Management & Provision of Services Effect and the Asset 
Intermediation Efficiency. 
2.2. Contextual Framework: Corporate Governance in Europe 
Europe has a very developed financial sector7 with many European cities acting as important 
financial hubs and it contains some of the largest banks in the world, counting 8 in the top 20 
biggest asset holding banks worldwide list in 20188. The European corporate landscape uses 
three main governance models. The Continental and Anglo-Saxon models dominate in Southern 
Europe. In Portugal and Italy, listed companies overwhelmingly use one of the two. Spanish 
limited companies are lawfully obligated to utilize the Anglo-Saxon model while in France the 
law allows for either, but the Anglo-Saxon model is by far the most adopted among listed firms. 
As for the Nordic countries, the Nordic model is dominant, as the name would suggest (Gerner-
Beuerle, Paech, Schuster, 2013). While these designations of corporate governance models 
encompass various groups of countries, there are still differences in the practiced governance 
within these groups as a consequence of legal, cultural and historical differences among the 
member countries, so these model groups should not be interpreted as uniform agglomerates 
but rather as groupings of firms with similar governance structures in place. Since no banks 
utilizing the Two-tiered model were included in the sample9, a detailed description of it was 
excluded from the paper’s main body and included as an appendix (refer to appendix 2). 
The Anglo-Saxon model, sometimes referred to as Anglo-American model, is also 
designated as the One-tier Board System since firms operating under it do so under unitary 
boards consisting of both executive and non-executive directors who, as a group, are 
                                                             
7 For a more detailed description of the banking industry and its European segment refer to appendix 1. 
8 Source: FXSSI website, TOP 20 Largest World Banks in 2018 by Total Assets page, available at 
https://fxssi.com/top-20-largest-world-banks-in-current-year [Accessed 23 October 2018]. 
9 The decision to exclude these banks from the sample resulted from there only being one of them that dodged all 
the exclusion criteria. Including only one two-tiered bank in the sample would not constitute a sufficient 
representation of the governance model to draw conclusions from. 
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responsible for the entirety of the firms’ activities, while non-executives should outnumber 
executives and hold posts of greater importance like the audit and compensation committees to 
avoid conflicts of interest as they are independent from the CEO. The risk of conflicts of interest 
arising is usually mitigated through the creation of committees which effectively separates the 
board’s various functions. Directors are elected by the shareholders at the annual general 
meeting and an executive director may be appointed by the board when the term of office of 
another director terminates which prevents the board from becoming paralyzed, but the co-
optation of a director needs to be confirmed at the following shareholders general meeting. The 
directors’ term durations usually vary from three to six years (ecoDa; International Finance 
Corporation, 2015).  
As for the Nordic model, it resembles the aforementioned model while differing in some 
respects. It’s structure is defined by four main pillars:”(i) Supremacy of the general meeting to 
decide any matters that do not expressly fall within the exclusive competence of any other 
company organ; (ii) A non-executive board of directors appointed by, and fully subordinated 
to, the shareholders in general meeting; (iii) An executive management function appointed by, 
and fully subordinate to, the board; and (iv) A statutory auditor appointed by, and reporting 
back primarily to, the shareholders in general meeting.” (Lekvall, 2014: 53). Therefore, the 
model’s structure resembles the Two-Tiered one in that the oversight and the executive 
functions are performed by separated boards in which participation in one automatically 
excludes one from the other while incorporating the executive and non-executive board member 
distinction from the one-tier model (see appendix 3 for a graphical representation). It also 
differs from both by granting the board with extended powers by granting it the responsibility 
for the firm’s strategy, organization, financial structure, risk management oversight and internal 
controls, leaving the day-to-day management to the CEO. Most of the board members are 
obligated to be independent of the company, while it is common for employees to appoint a 
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limited number of board members, and the CEO-chairman of the board duality is strictly 
forbidden. The standard mandate period for Nordic boards is one year while in Norway it is 
two, although effective total service time tends to be much longer (Danish Corporate 
Governance Committee; Finnish Securities Market Association; Icelandic Committee on 
Corporate Governance; Norwegian Corporate Governance Board; Swedish Corporate 
Governance Board, 2009). 
In summary, there are substantial governance mechanism differences between the Nordic 
and Southern European firms, particularly in board term durations, board sizes, number of 
executive directors and their allowed roles in the governance structure. 
3. Literature Review 
The literature about the determinants of banking profitability can be divided into two 
segments: firstly, there is the research regarding liquidity (and solvency’s) impact on 
profitability, and secondly, there is the literature about corporate governance’s influence on 
profitability. 
Influence of Liquidity on Profitability 
Prior to 2008, research that tied liquidity and profitability in the banking industry is scarce. 
Berger (1995) analyzed the association between bank earnings and capital for North American 
banks over the period of 1983-1989. The author found a significantly positive correlation 
between capital-to-asset ratio and return on equity, which is consistent with the expected 
bankruptcy cost hypothesis, which suggests that having a “higher capital reduces the probability 
that uninsured debt holders will have to bear the administrative, legal and asset devaluation 
costs of bank failure, and therefore lowers the required premium on uninsured debt.” (Berger, 
1995: p.454). 
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More recently, Morris and Shin (2009) decomposed the total credit risk of a bank into asset 
insolvency risk, the conditional probability of default due to deterioration of asset quality if 
there is no run by short term creditors, and illiquidity risk, the probability of a default due to a 
run when the institution would otherwise have been solvent. 
Past literature shows a two-sided influence on a bank’s profitability. On one hand, holding 
liquid assets decreases the institution’s probability of default, reducing financing costs and 
increasing profitability, while on the other, liquid assets have lower returns than their less liquid 
counterparts, representing an opportunity cost for the bank. 
As of late, Sahyouni and Wang (2018) extensively analyzed the impact of liquidity 
creation10 on profitability based on data from 4995 banks across 11 developed and emerging 
countries over the periods from 2011 to 2015. They concluded banks with a higher equity to 
assets ratio are relatively more profitable while banks with higher liquidity creation incur in 
higher levels of illiquidity risk and hence they obtain lower profitability. Moreover, the authors 
found that the effect of credit risk on bank profitability is negative and statistically significant, 
which corroborates the expected bankruptcy cost hypothesis. In addition, they also concluded 
that GDP growth and inflation are impactful as well (Sahyouni & Wang, 2018). 
Regarding solvency, Biraj Kumar Mohanty and Raveesh Krishnankutty (2018) studied 
the profitability of 46 indian banks over a 17 year period, finding that profitability, measured 
by ROA, had a significant positive correlation with solvency, while liquidity, proxied by loan-
to-deposits ratio, had a positive influence as well. Similarly, Petria, Capraru and Ihnatov (2015) 
found that solvency had a positive, yet small, effect on profitability on the studied European 
banks, while liquidity was, as expected, positively correlated. 
                                                             
10 Liquidity creation is the process described by Diamond (2007) through which banks provide consumers with 
more liquid assets than the ones they hold. 
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Influence of Corporate Governance on Profitability 
The relationship between corporate governance and profitability has been extensively 
studied, especially since 2008. However, results have not been consensual. Assessing the 
individual impacts of components and mechanisms of corporate governance on the overall 
performance of banks has been the preferred methodology for the statistical analysis of papers 
regarding the topic. 
Erhardt (2003) found a significantly positive correlation between the demographic 
diversity of the board of directors and financial performance in 127 large US firms. Kyereboah-
Coleman (2007) examined 103 listed firms from several African countries in the the five-year 
period of 1997-2001, and found that large and independent boards increase firm valuation, 
combined positions of CEO and board chair along with board activity intensity negatively 
impact performance while the CEO’s tenure in office and audit size committees positively 
impacts it, although these findings go against Handa’s (2018) which concluded that the effect 
of chairman-CEO duality is positive and Stephen et al.’s (2015) who noticed a negative 
correlation between profitability and audit committee size instead. Perhaps more comparable to 
a European  study sample is Salim, Arjomandi and Seufert’s (2016) study into 11 Australian 
banks between 1999 and 2013, since Australia is also a developed country with increased 
cultural proximity, and they found significantly positive relations between performance and 
bank size, board size and committee meetings, along with insignificant effects by the number 
of independent board members and number of board meetings (Salim et al., 2016). 
From the literature review, it can be concluded that banks with higher liquidity and solvency 
are generally expected to have increased profitability relative to ones holding less liquid 
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assets. Differences in corporate governance mechanisms are, generally, impactful as well, 
although there is still little consensus on how they impact profits exactly. Thus, this Work 
Project contributes to the literature by adding inputs to both topics which are of special value 
to the discussion on governance and profitability in the banking industry 
.4. Methodology and Research Questions 
4.1. Research Questions 
This purpose of this paper is to provide insight into the profitability gap between Nordic and 
Southern banks. From here, this paper’s main research question can be derived: 
RQ 1.: What causes the profitability differences between the Nordic and Southern European 
banks? 
Differences in liquidity levels and diverse corporate governance mechanisms in use by 
banks have been added as explanatory variables to the analysis of the observed profitability 
divide between Northern and Southern European banks. 
Past research focused on macroeconomic differences as explanatory variables (Sinn, 
D'Acunto; Oldrini; 2013), along with balance sheet vulnerabilities, with a special emphasis on 
non-performing loans, and business model differences (Soares, 2017; Detragiache, Tressel; 
Turk-Ariss; 2018). However, so far the corporate governance differences have been neglected, 
despite managers and members of the corporate governing bodies do take decisions which 
impact the operating profitability. From the relevant literature, it can be concluded that 
profitability is influenced by corporate governance, liquidity and macroeconomic factors. As 
such, the following secondary research questions emerge: 
RQ 1.1.: Are there relevant corporate governance differences between the Nordic and Southern 
European banks and how impactful are they? 
RQ 1.2.: Are there relevant liquidity differences between the Nordic and Southern European 
banks and how impactful are they? 
RQ 1.3.: How impactful are the macroeconomic differences? 
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4.2. Sample and Data Collection 
The sampling process considered four criteria for inclusion of banks, as follows: (i) banks 
included in the sample should be from Nordic (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) and 
Southern European countries (France, Italy Portugal and Spain); (ii) banks included should have 
positive Net Income during in the years of analysis the great majority; (iii) size criteria, based 
on the Total Assets of the banks, which at the end year of 2017, should be over 225 bn euros; 
(iv) banks should be listed in an EU based stock exchange. 
The criterion (i) for including banks in the sample is straightforward, as the purpose of 
the paper is to specifically address the Nordic-Southern European banking performance gap. 
Criterion (ii) is a requirement for positive ROAs, and the consequent meaningful analysis. 
Criterion (iii) intends to focus the study on the biggest banking institutions, under the 
assumption that macroeconomic impacts. Finally, criterion (iv) is due to the availability of data, 
since the Bloomberg terminal has very few corporate governance data from unlisted banks. 
As a result of the combination of the four criteria above, the sample for this research is 
composed by 12 banks: six of them from the Nordic countries of Denmark, Sweden, Norway 
and Finland and another six settled in the Southern European countries of France and Spain 
(refer to appendix 4 for the detailed list). The combined total assets of all the banks in the 
sample, together amounts to €9,537 billion, that is, circa 22% of the EU-28’s financial sector 
total assets, which valued at over €42,889 billion as of the end year of 201711. 
The period of analysis are the years from 2010 to 2017. One constraints of this paper is 
the need for ROA to be positive, in order to assure meaningful analysis. The year 2010 was 
                                                             
11 Source: European Banking Federation website, Statistical Annex page, available at https://www.ebf.eu/facts-
and-figures/statistical-annex/ [Accessed 9th of December 2018] 
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chosen to avoid the 2007 financial crisis’ effects and during the following years the operation 
of the European financial sector are of relative normal  (still it could be argued that issues like 
Brexit and the migrant crisis could have significant impacts).  
Data was gathered from the Bloomberg databases, which at the date of retrieval still did 
not contain corporate governance data for 2018. Thus, the most recent period of analysis in this 
research is the year-end of 2017, being this the most recent date with available data in the source 
database.  
Data collected include both end of the year and semi-annual observations. This procedure 
permits to monitor for mid-year and end of the period accounting manipulations. Two 
limitations regarding the data collection exist. One is the non-availability of mid-year, quarterly 
or monthly values for the corporate governance variables. Limiting the study to yearly values 
would effectively cut in half the gathered data points, provide a less continuous analysis by only 
accounting for end year values and ignore possible accounting manipulations the firms may 
employ to, for instance, present better end-year results in detriment of mid-year ones. As such, 
an assumption was made which considers the corporate governance variable of semi-annual 
values to be equal to the end of the year ones. Another limitation concerns instances of missing 
data, a total of 199 cells out of 5,760 cells of data, that were replaced by estimates based on the 
existing values’ trends and averages. 
4.3. Model of Research 
To properly asses the corporate governance’s impact on profitability the following proxies 
are used: Board size, Number of employee representatives on board, Percentage of non-
executive directors on board, Percentage of independent directors on board, Board duration, 
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Number of board meetings, Percentage of board meeting attendance, Audit committee size and 
Number of audit committee meetings.12 
Liquidity is represented by the three ratios: Net loans13 over total assets, Total deposits 
over total assets and Total interbank assets over total assets. All the three accounts in the 
numerators are cash, or near-cash items and the combination of these three ratios should provide 
a clear picture of the institutions’ liquidity values. Solvency will also be incorporated in the 
model through the Capital Adequacy Ratio under Basel II standards, as in the earliest studied 
periods of this paper, from 2010 until 2015, the banks estimated their capital adequacy through 
this method and the Basel III standards14 were only recently implemented.  
Based on past literature, macroeconomic variables are explanatory and impactful on 
profitability and, therefore, the model to test includes them, namely Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth, inflation rate, taxation and long-term interest rates. Taxation is measured by the 
Effective tax rate15 while the proxy for long-term interest rates is the Ten year government bond 
yield. 
It is worth noticing that implementation of the International Financial Reporting Standard 
(IFRS) 9 in 2018 is expected to negatively impact profits as far as impairments’ recognition 
increase. The implementation coincides to a sharp drop in the ROA of the Nordic banks, as 
                                                             
12 In addition, the following dummy variables were initially included but ultimately excluded due to their rarity 
within the sampled banks: CEO Duality, and Sustainability Committee. 
13 Total Loans net of Reserves for Loan Losses 
14 Under Basel III, the Capital Adequacy Ratio was to be replaced by the Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio, calculated 
through the division of Common Equity Tier 1 Capital, which encompasses common shares, retained earnings, 
stock surpluses resulting from the issue of common shares and common shares issued by subsidiaries and held by 
third parties, over Risk-Weighted Assets. 
15 Calculated by dividing the period’s income tax expenses by the pre-tax income and multiplying it by 100 to 
express the value as a percentage. 
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shown in figure 1, although some banks already applied IFRS 9 in financial reporting before 
2018.16  
The statistical analysis starts with a univariate analysis of the descriptive statistics of the 
variables in order to get feeling of the data, namely the minimum, maximum, mean and standard 
deviation. Afterwards, a k-means clustering was employed to study sample clustering. Finally, 
an ordinary least squares multilinear regression was tested, with a 95% confidence level. 
Equation [4] is the model of research: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑛  [4] 
Where the dependent variable,𝑌𝑡, is given as a function of 𝑋𝑛𝑡, the n explanatory variables 
studied during period t.  Each β coefficient represents how much and in what way, positive or 
negative, each corresponding variable impacts 𝑌𝑡. The 𝑎 parameter - the intercept - measures 
how much 𝑌𝑡 is affected by variables exogenous to the model and 𝜀𝑛 is the irreducible error 
component. Computed variables may not significantly impact the considered value and such 
issue is addressed through a null hypothesis test17. 
After excluding some of the initially considered variables due to low correlations with 
the dependent variable and multicollinearity issues, the final regression accounts for the 
following variables: Inflation Rate; GDP Growth; 10Yr Govt Bond Yield; Effective Tax Rate; 
Board Size; Percentage Non-Exec Directors on Board; Percentage Independent Directors; 
Board Duration Years; Size of Audit Committee; Audit Committee Meetings; Total Deposits 
over Total Assets; CAR and Bank Type (refer to Annex 1 for their detailed definitions).  
                                                             
16 Consequently, IFRS 9 implementation and its impact on profitability was initially taken into consideration as a 
dummy variable and an additional research question, but these were ultimately abandoned due to the scarcity of 
early adopters within the studied sample. 
17 This is a significance testing approach where the null hypothesis, a mathematical statement generally assumed 
to be true, is rejected in detriment of an alternative hypothesis if the observed data are significantly unlikely to 
have occurred should the null hypothesis be true. In this case, this testing will be applied to each variable where 
the null hypothesis is 𝛽𝑛 = 0 (n explanatory variable does not impact the dependent variable), and 𝛽𝑛 ≠ 0 is the 
alternative hypothesis (n explanatory variable impacts the dependent). 
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5. Data Analysis and Results 
5.1. Univariate Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Univariate statistical analysis, graphical comparison of the Southern and Nordic clusters’ average 
variable values, source: Excel 
Similarly to the macroeconomic trend, the sampled Nordic banks show bigger ROAs than 
the EU Southern banks during the majority of the studied period. The former banks are also 
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considerably more retail focused.  More than 60% of their banking activities focuses on retail 
banking while the Southern banks show values over 40% and tend to be slightly less liquid 
when measuring liquidity with the Total Deposits over Total Assets ratio. Regarding corporate 
governance, the sampled Nordic boards of directors have around half the sampled Southern 
board durations, show bigger board sizes of about five additional directors and have similar 
percentages of non-executive board directors with slight, fluctuating differences between the 
two clusters over the seven-year period. As for the effective tax rates, it is important to take into 
consideration that during semesters with negative profitability the effective tax rate is equal to 
zero. As such, since the sampled Southern banks showed many more periods with losses, 
particularly during the first three years of the studied period, it is concluded that Southern banks 
effectively operate under higher taxes than the Nordic ones. 
5.2. K-Means Cluster Analysis 
To mathematically verify the paper’s premise regarding the existence of Nordic and 
Southern clusters a k-means cluster analysis was conducted, this being the preferred method of 
conducting a clustering analysis since the existing number of clusters was already hypothesized. 
After defining the number of centroids18, this clustering method assigns each data point in the 
sample to the nearest cluster. Country-specific control variables were excluded, and the used 
variables were standardized according to their z-scores19 to place them in the same scale. As a 
result, all Nordic banks plus Banco Bilbao during its five more recent semesters were grouped 
in cluster one and all other banks were included in cluster two. Therefore, it is concluded that, 
                                                             
18 Centroids are geometrical centers of plane figures that correspond to the arithmetic mean position of all the 
points in the figure. In this case, it corresponds to the number of cluster averages (two). 
19 Z-scores correspond to the number of standard deviations by which the values of data points are above or below 
the mean value of the studied sample. Mathematically, they are given by: 𝑧 = (𝑥 − ?̅?) 𝑆⁄ , where x is the data 
point’s value, ?̅? is the studied sample’s mean and S is the sample’s standard deviation. 
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by and large, the sampled banks are clustered into Nordic and Southern European groups 
regarding the study’s considered variables. 
5.3. Multiple Regression Assumptions and Requirements 
To validly infer from the regression, its residuals20 must be normally distributed such that 
the observed values do not deviate excessively from the normality line in the probability plots. 
Consequently, the variables GDP Growth, Percentage Board Meeting Attendance and Total 
Interbank Assets over Total Assets were excluded (see Appendix 5). First order autocorrelation 
must be absent from the model and with a Durbin-Watson test value of 1,665 (see Figure 3 
ahead) that falls between the two critical values of one point five and two point five this 
condition is verified. The residuals must be equally distributed i.e. the data must be 
homoscedastic, and normally distributed, and such is confirmed by the dispersed residuals 
scatter plot and normal P-P plot (see Appendix 6). Finally, multicollinearity, that is, the 
predictor variables being highly correlated among themselves, must be absent from the model 
as well, and this was verified by analyzing each variable’s variance inflation factor21 and 
guaranteeing that their values were between the critical values of one and ten. This requirement 
was verified after dropping the Net Loans over Total Assets independent variable and the 
country-specific control variables (see Annex 2 for the values). 
5.4. Multiple Regression Results 
RQ 1.: What causes the profitability differences between the Nordic and Southern European 
banking institutions? 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,768a ,590 ,555 ,076297649900
000 
1,665 
                                                             
20 Residuals, or error terms, are the differences between the observed value and the predicted value of a variable.  
21 VIF is a model with multiple terms’ ratio of variance over the variance of the model with one term alone and it 
measures the degree of multicollinearity within the model. 
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Figure 3 – Multiple regression model summary, source: SPSS 
With a R-squared22 of 0.590, the paper’s multiple regression model shows to be a reasonable 
predictor of banking profitability, given the field’s inherent significant amount of unexplainable 
variation. It shows how the different corporate governance models adopted by the two clusters 
have mixed results on profitability, with no model being strictly superior to the other. In 
addition, it shows how the higher liquidity of the Southern banks is shrinking the profitability 
gap between the two groups, while the higher Southern tax rates are widening it. 
RQ 1.1.: Are there relevant corporate governance differences and how impactful are they? 
 With a β coefficient23 of 0.023 (see Annex 2 for the β values), board duration positively 
affects profitability.  The Nordic corporate governance model mandates board terms to be one 
year (two years in Norway), while the Southern banks show longer mandates, an average almost 
four years in the period of analysis. Board size’s coefficient stands at -0.016 and the Nordic 
banks’ have boards with less members, around five fewer board members than the Southern 
ones. The percentage of non-executive directors on the board is also significant and shows a β 
of 0.110, but during the studied period there were only small, alternating differences between 
the two clusters. Percentage of independent directors, number of board meetings, audit 
committee size and number of audit committee meetings are non-significant with p-values24 
greater than 0.05. As such and in accordance to the hypothesis, there are indeed major 
differences in the corporate governance mechanisms employed by the biggest Nordic and 
                                                             
22 The R-square statistic, also depicted as 𝑅2, measures the percentage of variance in a regression’s dependent 
variable that is explained by its independent variables as a collective. In this case, 59% of the variance in the ROA 
is given by the included variables. 
23 The beta coefficients, in multiple regressions, measures the degree of change in the dependent variable for every 
unitary change in the independent variables associated with the coefficients. In this case, the model indicates that 
an increase in a bank’s board of directors’ term duration by one year leads to an increase in that bank’s ROA, 
expressed as a percentage of total assets, by 0.023%. 
24 The mentioned p-values are related to the null hypothesis that the variables’ coefficients are likely equal to zero, 
i.e. the variables are likely non-significant. Given the study considers a 95% confidence interval, for a variable to 
be considered significant its associated p-value must be lower than 0.05. 
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Southern European banks, but no model is strictly superior to the other in terms of profitability 
impacts. 
RQ 1.2.: Are there relevant liquidity or solvency differences and how impactful are they? 
The Southern banks show higher levels of liquidity, which, given the positive coefficient, 
seems to be pulling the clusters’ profitability ratios closer together. Liquidity, proxied by the 
total deposits over total assets ratio, is significant (p-value =0.002) and shows a β of 0.395, in 
line with past literature on the topic. As for solvency, proxied by the CAR, it is non-significant 
(p-value=0.359). 
RQ 1.3.: How impactful are the macroeconomic differences? 
The effective tax rate is significant (p-value=0.00) and its coefficient assumes a value of 
-0.291. That being said, excluding the first three years of the studied period where the Southern 
banks had the most negative results, they consistently show higger effective tax rates by a five 
to ten percent margin over the Nordic banks, so it is clear that they are subject to higher tax 
rates that ultimately hinder profitability. Notably, inflation rate and the government bond yields 
do not show significant impacts on ROA (p-values of 0.776 and 0.573 respectively). 
Regarding business models, the increased focus on retail banking by the biggest Nordic 
banks is having a positive impact on profitability (β=0.182; p-value=0.047) compared to their 
more investment focused Southern counterparts.  
Besides these results, a small, albeit significant (β=-0.023; p-value=0.046), relationship 
was found for the semi-annual control variable. This implies that profitability ratios on the 
second semester of the year tends to be smaller than in the first one. This adds to the debate that 
risk management models in the banking industry, usually set for a 12-month period, possible 
focuses more on the short-term results. 
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6. Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to provide insight into the Nordic-Southern European banking 
profitability divide while contributing to the literature on banking profitability. Previous studies 
disregarded the corporate governance differences that exist between the two, so this Work 
Project sought to build a sturdier explanatory model by incorporating these, while 
simultaneously accounting for liquidity, solvency, macroeconomic, business model and time 
period variables. The conducted statistical analysis showed that the existing governance 
differences between the two bank groups have mixed impacts on profitability, with no 
governance model being strictly superior to the other and excluding corporate governance as 
one of the causes for the profitability divide in the biggest banks. In addition, the higher liquidity 
levels shown in the biggest Southern banks are pulling the two groups closer together while the 
increased focus on retail banking by the biggest Nordics and higher Southern tax rates are 
driving them apart. Besides these results, the studied bank sample showed a tendency for 
profitability to be smaller during the second semester of each studied year which translates as 
a short-term focus. 
Nevertheless, to fully interpret this paper’s conclusions one should be aware of its 
limitations. Having focused exclusively on banks with total asset values larger than €225 bn as 
of 2017, this study fails to provide a complete, comprehensive picture of the profitability divide 
by excluding smaller banks and any impact that firm size may have on profitability remained 
unaccounted for as well. Also, all sampled Southern banks operated under the one-tier 
governance model, while a substantial number of Southern European institutions, particularly 
in Portugal and Italy, utilize the two-tier model instead. Despite these, another limitation was 
the study’s focus on the governance mechanisms themselves in detriment of the governing 
directors’ qualifications, demographics and compensations. Future research could elaborate on 
these topics and offer complementary conclusions to this paper’s.  
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8. Annexes 
Annex 1 – Multiple regression variables’ description table. 
Inflation Rate It is calculated through the semesterly growth rates of national consumer prices25. 
GDP Growth The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a measure of the final market value of all goods and 
services produced/provided within a country. An expenditure approach was utilized, 
measuring total final expenditures at purchaser’s prices, including exports less imports and 
adjusted for inflation, and this variable represents this indicator’s semesterly growth rate. 
10Yr Govt Bond 
Yields 
It represents the yields of the banks’ respective countries’ government bonds with a ten 
year maturity, these being debt securities issued by the governments to support 
governmental spending. These usually represent safer alternative investments for the 
banks. 
Effective Tax 
Rate 
It is a measure of a bank’s total tax paid as a percentage of its accounting income, calculated 
as: 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 × 100 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒⁄ . 
Board Size Is the number of full-time directors on a bank’s board excluding deputy members. For 
firms with supervisory and management boards, this is the number of directors on the 
supervisory board. 
 
Percentage Non-
Exec Directors 
on Board 
Is comprised of non-executive directors, as of the fiscal year end when available, otherwise 
as of the date of the latest filing. It includes outside directors when applicable and is 
represented as a percentage of the total number of board members. 
Percentage 
Independent 
Directors 
It is the percentage of board members who do not have vested interests in the firm or 
persons related to it. 
Board Duration 
Years 
Is the length of a board member’s term, in years, prior to renewals for boards which allow 
terms. 
Size of Audit 
Committee 
Number of fulltime directors who are members of the bank’s audit committee, excluding 
deputy members. 
                                                             
25 Consumer prices are a measure of prices paid by consumers for a market basket of consumer goods and services. 
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Audit 
Committee 
Meetings 
Number audit committee meetings during the reporting period. 
Total Deposits 
over Total 
Assets 
Liquidity ratio comprised by the total deposits received from customers over the total of 
all short and long-term assets as reported on the balance sheet. 
CAR Short for Capital Adequacy Ratio, it measures the solvency of the bank through Basel II 
standards, dividing the sum of the tier one and two capital values by the risk-weighted 
assets. 
Bank Type Is a ratio that quantifies a bank’s focus on retail or investment banking activities through 
the following equation  
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒
= 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 + 𝑆𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑇 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 +⁄ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) 
As such, the closer this value is to 1 the more retail focused the bank will be while a value 
closer to 0 indicates an investment banking focus. 
ROA 1 Is the standard Return on Assets ratio used in the banking industry composed by net income 
over total assets but expressed in percentage to show bigger, more easily interpreted 
regression coefficients. 
 
Annex 2 – Multiple regression coefficients’ table, source: SPSS 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta 
Toleranc
e VIF 
1 (Constant) ,236 ,079  2,975 ,003   
Inflation_Rate ,196 ,689 ,018 ,285 ,776 ,611 1,638 
10Yr_Govt_Bond_Yields -,612 1,084 -,070 -,565 ,573 ,154 6,512 
Effective_Tax_Rate -,291 ,071 -,221 -4,096 ,000 ,799 1,251 
Board_Size -,016 ,003 -,478 -5,182 ,000 ,273 3,659 
Percentage_Non_Exec_Directors
_on_Board 
,110 ,047 ,153 2,328 ,021 ,537 1,863 
Percentage_Independent_Directo
rs 
-,033 ,053 -,045 -,629 ,530 ,463 2,158 
Board_Duration_Years ,023 ,009 ,286 2,740 ,007 ,214 4,683 
Number_Board_Meetings ,001 ,002 ,032 ,522 ,602 ,604 1,656 
Size_of_Audit_Committee -,007 ,009 -,056 -,701 ,484 ,363 2,756 
Audit_Committee_Meetings -,003 ,003 -,076 -1,191 ,235 ,573 1,745 
Total_Deposits_over_Total_Asse
ts 
,395 ,125 ,363 3,167 ,002 ,178 5,624 
CAR ,217 ,236 ,092 ,919 ,359 ,233 4,300 
Bank_Type ,182 ,091 ,278 1,998 ,047 ,120 8,325 
Time_Period -,002 ,003 -,085 -,743 ,458 ,177 5,661 
Semester -,023 ,012 -,101 -2,009 ,046 ,915 1,093 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA_1 
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9. Appendices 
Contextual Framework: The EU Banking Industry and country/region specificities 
 
The banking sector is made up from all the financial institutions that are licensed by the 
governments to supply banking services. These services consist of storing and transferring 
wealth, granting credit or providing risk management when acquiring and holding various 
forms and portfolios of wealth. From a macroeconomic point of view, this industry is of 
particular importance as it is responsible for the transferal of funds from the saver entities to 
the credit users. Firms within this sector can be further divided according to the finality of the 
bank deposits each receives and the tradable claims each issue against itself. Should these 
support the extension of credit to the household consumers it consists of retail banking, while 
providing credit to nonfinancial businesses consists of commercial banking. These may also 
take the form of underwritten debt and equity securities26 for all kinds of companies, consisting, 
in this case, of investment banking. These institutions also provide services in aiding with 
mergers and acquisitions and in providing guidance to issuers regarding the issuance and 
placement of stock. Lending against real estate is designated as mortgage banking, while 
extending credit internationally can be defined as merchant banking27. For research purposes, 
all lending activity within banks will be labeled as retail banking, be it business to business or 
business to consumer, and all other operational revenue will be designated as investment 
banking to effectively separate and study how focusing on each may alter banks’ profitabilities. 
                                                             
26 Securities are negotiable financial assets that hold monetary value, being considered equity should they represent 
an ownership position in a firm, or debt when a creditor relationship is in place instead. 
27 Providing credit to other financial institutions in times of external pressure on liquidity and being in charge of 
the production of money is designated as central banking. These types of banks fall out of the scope of this paper 
and are not considered in the sample. 
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Figure 4 – European Banking Industry SWOT Analysis 
Despite it being home to many independent countries, the adoption of the Euro as the official 
currency by a great number of these (19 out of the 28 European Union (EU) member states) has 
greatly facilitated cash flow transactions within the European Union and increased the 
connectedness of their economies while largely decreasing exchange rate fluctuations in benefit 
to the financial sector. Also benefitting to the industry is the high economic development of the 
region, creating an overall benign economic environment after having gone through the Great 
Recession of 2007 and the Eurozone crisis of 2010-2015. Still, Brexit is an ongoing issue that 
plagues the sector with uncertainty and the Euro and British Pound currencies have severely 
devalued. This may have contributed to the shrinking of the industry’s total assets since 2010 
(refer to appendix 7 for a detailed graph), but, remarkably, total equity levels have steadily 
increased during the same period (refer to appendix 8 for a detailed graph). Some of the main 
drivers of this tendency must have been the shrinking business volumes and an asset de-risking 
process, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) noted a steady increase in the European 
Strengths:
- High overall solvency 
- Overall benign economic environment
- Safer business model
Weaknesses:
- Low overall profitability
- Nordic-Southern performance gap
- Shrinking total assets
Opportunities:
- Potential in digital business model 
innovation
Threats:
- Upcoming regulation is expected to 
negatively impact profits
- Huge non-performing loan ammounts in 
some Southern banks
- Brexit uncertainty
European Banking 
Industry
SWOT Analysis
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Bank System Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets ratio28 over the period (refer to 
Appendix 9 for a detailed graph). This, combined with an increasing Common Equity Tier 1 
ratio29 among these institutions whose median now amounts to almost 17% (refer to ppendix 
10 for a detailed graph), a value well above the recommended minimum of 8%, grants European 
banks a generally high solvency. This de-risking process is also reflected in the revenues side. 
The trading income, which also encompasses income derived from foreign exchange and 
hedging transactions, and the other income accounts, the two less reliable sources of income, 
together accounted for less than 20% of total revenues in the top 20 biggest European banks as 
of 2017, a value well below the 37% registered pre 2007 crisis, so European banks are assuming 
a safer and more sustainable business model. As a whole though, revenues have shrunk over 
the past decade by about 23% while net income after tax was halved, conferring these 
institutions an overall low profitability, especially when compared to their American 
counterparts (Deutsche Bank Research; 2017). On an additional note, the implementation of 
the IFRS 930 norm resulted in an earlier recognition of credit impairment provisions which 
increases the impairment provisions account, negatively impacting profits. The extent to which 
this standard increases expenses, however, is still being assessed, with the Standard Bank 
Group, for example, having registered an increase in the impairment provisions account by 
approximately 32% (Standard Bank Group, 2018). 
Disregarding aggregate indicators, the existence of clusters within the European banking 
industry becomes very noticeable, being of note the previously mentioned Nordic and Southern 
                                                             
28 Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets ratio is calculated using total regulatory capital as the numerator and 
risk-weighted assets as the denominator. It measures the capital adequacy of deposit takers and the degree to which 
financial institutions can withstand shocks to their balance sheets. 
29 Common Equity Tier 1 is a ratio introduced in 2014 by the Basel Committee that is calculated through the 
division of Common Equity Tier 1 Capital (common shares, stock surpluses resulting from the issue of common 
shares, retained earnings, common shares issued by subsidiaries and held by third parties, and accumulated other 
comprehensive income) by the institution’s total Risk-Weighted Assets. 
30 International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 Financial Instruments was issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) on the 24th of July, 2014. This standard replaced International Accounting 
Standard (IAS) 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. 
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clusters. Not only does the Nordic one show a consistently better performance, as depicted in 
the figure 1, but the differences extend to nearly all other accounting indicators. Nordic banks 
are more solvent, showing an average Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio 5% bigger than the 
Southern one (see appendix 11 for a plot of the comparison’s progression) and have increased 
capital adequacy31 with a capital adequacy ratio (CAR)32 around 6% bigger than the Southern 
one (see appendix 12 for a graphed progression of the comparison). But perhaps more worrying 
is the difference in non-performing loans to total loans ratios. The Southern banks show much 
larger numbers here having a difference of over 8% for the majority of the accounted period 
since 2010 with the Italian and Portuguese ones being the main culprits (Italians showed a 
14.38% ratio while the Portuguese presented a 13.29%) (see appendix 13). 
Appendix 1 – Contextual Framework: The EU Banking Industry and country/region specificities. 
 
The Continental Corporate Governance Model 
 
Regarding the Continental Model, it is commonly referred to as the Two-tier Board System 
or even by the German word Aktiengesellschaft in German speaking countries. The “two-tier” 
in its name comes from firms employing two boards in their structures: a supervisory board, 
generally controlled by the shareholders while employees may hold seats as well, and a 
management board, that effectively runs the firm. Supervisory board members are appointed 
by the shareholders at the general meeting and are usually independent of the firm. These may 
be dismissed by the shareholders at any general meeting. They are in charge of monitoring the 
management board’s performance, the latter being made up entirely of executive directors, 
while also loosely guiding it through involvement in long term strategic planning. The members 
                                                             
31 The extent to which depositor are protected and the institution is able to withstand financial shocks. 
32 This ratio is calculated by dividing the sum of tier 1 capital, which can absorb losses without a bank being 
required to cease trading, and of tier 2 capital, which can absorb losses but requires the winding up of the bank, 
by the bank’s risk-weighted credit exposure. 
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of the latter may be removed by the supervisory board who also defines the management 
board’s remuneration. In some cases, management boards assign their own compensations, but 
these are relatively rare. Being a member of one board excludes you from the other, effectively 
separating management from control (ecoDa; International Finance Corporation, 2015). 
Appendix 2 – The Continental corporate governance model description. 
 
 
Appendix 3 – Two-tier vs Nordic vs One-tier corporate governance models source: Lekvall, P., 2014. The Nordic 
Corporate Governance Model, Stockholm: SNS Förlag, p.60. 
 
Nordic 
Cluster 
Swedbank 
AB 
Skandinaviska 
Banken 
Svenska 
Handelsbanken 
AB 
Danske 
Bank 
Nordea 
Bank Abp 
Den Norske 
Bank 
Southern 
Cluster 
Crédit 
Agricole 
S.A. 
BNP Paribas Société 
Générale S.A. 
Natixis S.A. Banco 
Santander 
S.A. 
Banco 
Bilbao 
Vizcaya 
Argentaria 
 
Appendix 4 – List of the paper’s sampled banks. 
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Appendix 5 – Probability plots of the excluded non-normally distributed variables, source: SPSS 
 
 
Appendix 6 – Residuals scatter plot and P-P plot respectively, source: SPSS 
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Appendix 7 – European banking sector total assets (bn €), 2010 S1 – 2018 S1, sum of U.K., Germany, France, 
Spain, Netherlands, Italy, Ireland, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Portugal, Greece, Austria, Finland 
and Slovenia’s sectors, source: Bloomberg terminal, ECB 
 
  
Appendix 8 – European banking sector total equity (bn €), 2010 S1- 2018 S1, sum of U.K., Germany, France, 
Spain, Netherlands, Italy, Ireland, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Portugal, Greece, Austria, Finland 
and Slovenia’s sectors, source: Bloomberg terminal, ECB 
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Appendix 9 – European median banking system regulatory capital to RWAs ratio, 2010 S1 – 2018 S2, median of 
Germany, U.K., France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Slovenia, source: Bloomberg terminal, IMF FSI indicator. 
 
 
Appendix 10 – Average of the European Banking industry median CET1 ratios, 2010 S1 – 2018 S2, median of 
U.K., Germany, France, Spain, Netherlands, Italy, Ireland, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, Portugal, Greece, Austria, 
Finland, Slovenia and Luxembourg, source: Bloomberg terminal, ECB. 
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Appendix 11 – Average of the Nordic and Southern banking sectors median CET1 ratios, 2010 S1 – 2018 S1, 
source: Bloomberg terminal, ECB 
 
 
Appendix 12 – Average of the Nordic and Southern banking sectors median bank system regulatory capital to risk-
weighted assets ratios, 2010 S1 – 2018 S1, source: Bloomberg terminal, IMF 
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Appendix 13 – Average of the Nordic and Southern banking sectors median non-performing loans to total loans 
ratios, 2010 S1 – 2018 S1, source: Bloomberg terminal, IMF (note that the 2018 S1 period results do not account 
for Italian, Portuguese, Finnish or Norwegian inputs due to the lack of data). 
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